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DAWAVENDAWA V. SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRIC.
IMPROVEMENT & POWER DIST.,
276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002)
FACTS
The Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District
(SRP) operated the Navajo Generating Station (NGS) on lands leased from
the Navajo Nation (Nation).' Pursuant to the lease, SRP was required to
extend an employment preference to qualified local Navajo. 2  SRP could
only hire a non-Navajo if there was a lack of Navajos qualified for the
position.3 Harold Dawavendawa, a member of the Hopi tribe, applied for a
job as an Operator Trainee at the station. He took the required
qualifications test and scored ninth out of twenty applicants.
Notwithstanding his score, he received neither an offer, nor an interview.6
Dawavendawa filed suit against SRP under Title VII,7 alleging
discrimination on the basis of his national origin.' SRP moved for summary
judgment, arguing that its contract with the Nation required that it give
preference to Navajo applicants, a preference allowed by the Indian
preferences exemption of Title VII.9 The district court agreed and dismissed
the case.'0 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
discrimination based on tribal affiliation creates a cause of action under Title
VII. SRP appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari and
remanded the case back to the district court."
On remand, SRP once again moved for dismissal, arguing that
Dawavendawa failed to join the Nation as an indispensable party. 12  The





' Id. at 1154.
6 id.
The statute states that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2003).
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district court granted defendant's motion and once again, Dawavendawa
appealed.13
HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. 4 The court
held that the Navajo Nation is a necessary and indispensable party under
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 As tribal sovereign
immunity prevented the nation from being sued by a private individual,
Dawavendawa's case had to be dismissed.'
6
ANALYSIS
Judge Trott, writing for the unanimous court, began his analysis with
a review of the joinder requirements of Rule 19, to wit, that a party (here, the
Nation) necessary for just adjudication must be joined if feasible.' 7 If this
party cannot be joined, the court must determine if the party is indispensable,
i.e., the case cannot continue without them."8 If so, the case must be
dismissed.' 9
Indispensability is determined through a two-part analysis. 20 The
first step of the analysis, as dictated in Rule 19(a), requires a determination
as to whether the nation is a necessary party. The second step requires a
determination of indispensability. 2' Necessity can be shown in one of two
ways: either complete relief cannot occur without the party, or the party has
a legally protected interest. 22 If an interest is found, the party's absence must
either (1) put that interest at risk of impairment, or (2) run the risk that the
plaintiff will be exposed to a risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations
because of that interest.
Turning to the instant matter, the court first held that complete relief
cannot occur without the Nation.24 It reasoned that even were Dawavendawa
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use tribal courts to prevent SRP from hiring non-Navajos, including
Dawavendawa. 5 On the other hand, if SRP refused to enforce the district
court's order, not only would it face possible sanctions from the federal court
system, Dawavendawa still would not have his job.26 Stuck between the
proverbial "rock and a hard place" in either situation, the court reasoned,
complete relief could not be had, regardless of its decision.27 This being so,
the nation was a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(l).
2
1
While satisfaction of only one prong of Rule 19(a) qualified the
nation as a necessary party, the court further considered whether the nation
satisfied the other criteria set forth therein.29 It first examined Rule
19(a)(2)(i), and found that this test too was satisfied. ° It was undisputed that
the Nation and SRP had a contract between them.3 A successful claim by
Dawavendawa would invalidate a least part of this contract, and call into
question the contractual relationship between SRP and the Nation.32
Looking at its prior case law, specifically Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway,33 the
court reiterated the importance that all parties to a contract had to be present
in an action to set aside that contract.34 The court took notice that the Nation
stressed the importance of the hiring preference in its contract with SRP,
even alleging that without it, the Nation would have never agreed to the
concessions SRP received vis-A-vis Navajo resources.35  Furthermore,
challenging the Nation's right to negotiate contracts as it deemed fit put a
severe restriction upon its ability to govern itself effectively.36 Taken in toto,
these reasons and the general rule of prior precedent convinced the court that
the Nation was a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(2)(i) as well.37
The court continued its analysis in asking whether the nation was a
necessary party under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii). 8 Of especial concern to the court








32 Id. at 1156-57.
33 Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975).
34 Dawavendawa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (9th
Cir. 2002).
31 Id. at 1157.
36 id.
37 Id.
3 Id. at 1158.
39id.
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Dawavendawa and SRP hired him, the court would have ordered a breach of
contract actionable in tribal court, where the Nation would almost certainly
prevail.4 ° If, however, SRP refused to hire him, SRP would face the distinct
possibility of sanctions for willfully violating an order of a United States
court.4' The uncomfortable position between the court systems of the two
dueling sovereigns met the requirements of Rule 19(a)(2)(ii), again making
the nation a necessary party.42
The court then rejected Dawavendawa's argument as to why this
problem was illusionary.43 Dawavendawa claimed that the court's decision
in Dawavendawa 144 stood for the proposition that SRP's conduct was a
violation of Title VII.45 Interpreting its prior decision, the court stated that
the scope of that decision was not so broad.46 That decision stood only for
the fact that Dawavendawa had a cause of action and did not address the
merits of the claim.47 Nor could Dawavendawa show any precedent that
would show that SRP's proffered defense was "baseless, specious, and
violative of Rule I I," as he claimed.48 Without any support for his broad
allegations, the court refused to accept his invitation to ignore SRP's
defense.49
Having decided that the nation was a necessary party under all three
prongs of the tests enumerated in Rule 19(a), the court considered whether or
not the Nation could be joined as a party. ° As a general rule, federally
recognized Indian tribes, similar to states, are immune from suit.51 This
immunity is set aside only if abrogated by Congress or waived by the
sovereign.52 Neither situation occurred.53 Nonetheless, Dawavendawa
argued that if the nation itself is immune, he could sue tribal officials. 4 The




44 Dawavendawa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998).












5 lid.56 Burlington N. R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991 ).
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and Arizona Public Service Co. v. Aspaas, s the court had held that tribal
officials acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute could be sued.58
However, these cases were distinguishable from Dawavendawa. 9 In both
cases, the tribal officials had taken positive action to enforce the statutes in
question, while no such action occurred here.6 ° Without this required
positive action, Dawavendawa's attempt to substitute tribal officials for the
Nation itself was merely a "ploy" to make an "end run" around sovereign
immunity. 61 This the court would not allow. 62 So being, the court held that
the Nation enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit.
63
Having decided both that the nation was a "necessary" party and that
it could not be sued, the court turned to the issue of whether or not it was an
"indispensable" party. 64 If the Nation were found indispensable, the suit
would have to be dismissed.65 The court employed a four part balancing test
based on "(1) the prejudice to any party or to the absent party; (2) whether
relief can be shaped to lessen prejudice; (3) whether an adequate remedy,
even if not complete, can be awarded without the absent party; and (4)
whether there exists an alternative forum. 6 6 This last factor was considered
especially important, and if no alternative forum existed, the court would be
"extra cautious" to dismiss.67 All of these factors tilted toward the Nation,
and concurrently, toward dismissal.68
The determination of prejudice followed much along the same lines
as the analysis of necessity under Rule 19(a)(2)(i). 69 Having reached a
determination in favor of necessity earlier, the court confirmed it again.70
Shaping relief or partial relief could not mitigate this prejudice. 7' Finally, the
court noted that Dawavendawa was not without a potential alternative
forum. He could, for instance, bring a suit through the auspices of the
EEOC, which as a manifestation of the United States, is not bound by the
" Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1996).
58 Dawavendawa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir.
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principle of sovereign immunity.73 Alternatively, he could use the method
endorsed by the court in Aspaas, i.e., bring suit in tribal court.74 Assuming a
negative result occurred, tribal officials would have then committed the
positive action required to permit suit against them.75
For these reasons, the court determined that the Nation was
indispensable.76 The suit could not continue without the Nation and it could
not be sued.77  So being, the court dismissed Dawavendawa's suit and
affirmed the district court's decision. 78 Dawavendawa appealed his negative
result to the Supreme Court, which once again denied certiorari.7 9
CONCLUSION
Dawavendawa is first read as a procedural case that creates another
hurdle for a potential plaintiff to satisfy what is, more or less, an exhaustion
requirement based upon the court's decision in Aspaas. That is, the potential
plaintiff, ill-treated by a sovereign tribe, must first bring his cause in the
courts of that sovereign. Should he lose, he has thus created a situation
whereby tribal officials have taken positive action against him, creating
jurisdiction where none had existed beforehand.
While such a requirement may discourage some plaintiffs, unable or
unwilling to bring multiple claims to vindicate their claims, it is hardly earth
shattering, and does not spell the end of their claims. A larger, more
fundamental, problem is called back into question and remains unanswered
by the court: do Sovereign tribes have carte blanche to blatantly
discriminate against non-tribal members without fear of remedial action?
The Indian Preferences exemption, codified in Title VII allows hiring
preferences to be given to "Indian[s] living on or near a reservation."' If,
however, discrimination against non-Indians was acceptable on public policy
grounds, left unanswered was whether one tribe had the right to discriminate
against another.
The EEOC answered in the negative: in a 1988 policy statement, the
Commission concluded that the "extension of an employment preference on







79 Dawavendawa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 537 U.S. 820 (2002).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (2003).
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Title VII."' This conclusion was based on three factors: (1) legislative
intent to disallow tribal distinctions and encourage "pan-Indianism 82; (2)
other federal regulations prohibiting distinctions on a tribal basis; (3)
inequities of preferential treatment in areas where more then one tribe
resides.8" No federal court, however, addressed the issue until
Dawavendawa L
The court rejected the idea of deference to the EEOC statement but
nonetheless agreed with it in principle, holding that tribal discrimination did
not fall under the aegis of the Indian Preferences exemption. 4 This reading
held sway amongst commentators and was advanced by Dawavendawa in the
instant manner; it was, however, rejected by the court.
The court explained its prior holding in Dawavendawa I by stating
that said holding spoke only to the issue of whether or not Dawavendawa had
a cause of action, and did not address the merits of his potential claim.8 5 As
it fails to reach the merits in the case at bar as well, the question remains as
to whether the Navajo (and Indian tribes in general) can justify
discrimination against Indians of other tribes. The seeming clarity of
Dawavendawa I is thrown by the wayside. It remains to a future plaintiff to
test this unexplainable gap in the law.
It is perhaps not surprising that this case arose in the context of
Navajo-Hopi relations. The Hopi reservation lies within the larger Navajo
territory, and animosity between the tribes is high, manifesting itself over a
long history of lawsuits and counter-suits.86 So too may the Navajo
themselves be susceptible to nationalistic hiring practices. Complex
historical and sociological reasons led the Navajo culture to be more resistant
to Spanish and later American pressures of assimilation and forced removal.
Historians and anthropologists have noted that this, in turn, has led to a
stronger identity amongst the Navajo as "Navajo," as opposed to a larger
"Indian" identity constructed against the "Whiteness" of the state. Non-
Navajo observers attribute the popular conception of Navajo "arrogance" and
feeling of cultural superiority to this identity.
81 Policy Statement on Indian Preference Under Title VII, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 6647, 6653 (May
16,1988).
82 Similar to pan-Africanism or pan-Arabism, pan-Indianism is a movement designed to downplay
traditional cultural differences, instead emphasizing similarity amongst all "Indians," especially counter-
posed against non-Indians.
83 405 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) at 6654.
"Dawavendawa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir.
1998).
85 Dawavendawa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir.
2002).
86 See Dawavendawa 1, 154 F.3d at 1118.
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Accepting such a theory may tease out the cultural rationale behind
Navajo hiring preferences, but it does not answer the policy question of
desirability of such practice. I would suggest that such practice should not
be encouraged. Indian preferences serve as some remedy, much like
affirmative action programs, for long-standing hegemonic practices of
discrimination and denial of basic human rights. While not without their
problems or critics, such practices serve a valuable and arguably necessary
purpose.
Such purpose is diluted when preferences act not against the
benefactors of historical hegemonic practice (here, non-Indians), but against
other groups similarly situated. Allowing the Indian preferences exemption
to be read as allowing inter-tribal discrimination shifts the exemption from
being remedy for wrongs committed against the group as a whole to
fostering tribal nationalism that has the potential to create future wrongs of
its own. If Congress intends this, so be it, but it was not the intent of the
Indian Preferences Act, and should not be read into it.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Erik Swanson
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